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ABSTRACT
Persuasion is a fundamental part of social activity, yet it is rarely studied by economists. We compare
the traditional economic model, in which persuasion is communication of objectively valuable
information, with a behavioral model, in which persuasion is an effort to fit the message into the
audience's already held beliefs. We present a simple formalization of the behavioral model, and
compare the two models using data on financial advertising in Money and Business Week magazines
over the course of the internet bubble. The evidence on the content of the persuasive messages is















1.  Introduction. 
 
  In most societies, a tremendous amount of resources is devoted to persuasion 
(McCloskey and Klamer 1995).  Selling, advertising, political campaigns, organized religion, 
law, much of the media, and good parts of education are devoted to getting people to accept 
certain ideas.  The activity of persuasion is not just an expenditure of resources; the content of 
the message crucially shapes its effectiveness.  But what constitutes persuasive content?   
  In this paper, we compare traditional and behavioral models of persuasion.  In the 
traditional model (Stigler 1961), persuasion is communication of objectively useful information.  
“Advertising may be defined as the provision of information on the availability and quality of a 
commodity” (Stigler 1987, p. 243).  In the behavioral model, in contrast, persuasion caters or 
panders to the prevailing beliefs even if these beliefs are inaccurate.  In the process, 
characteristics of the product are integrated into the prevailing beliefs of the customer using 
either factual or spurious messages.  There are few outright lies, but many more insinuations 
aimed at harnessing a pre-existing and possibly false belief.  To take a famous example, Alberto 
Culver Natural Silk Shampoo contained some silk, and was advertised with a slogan “We put 
silk in a bottle.”  The idea was obviously to suggest that the product makes hair silky, even 
though the company spokesman conceded that “silk doesn’t really do anything for hair” 
(Carpenter, Glazer, and Nakamoto 1994).  In the behavioral model, far from trying to convince 
the audience that it holds erroneous beliefs, the persuader attempts to benefit from such beliefs
2.   
Our goal is to compare these two models using data on financial advertising.  We 
examine advertisements in Money and Business Week magazines over a decade 1994-2003: 
before, during and after the internet bubble.  Financial advertising is helpful for distinguishing 
                                                 
2 Some Bayesian models make a similar prediction.  If individuals are unsure of the source’s credibility, they may 
see the source as credible if its message matches their priors (Prendergast 1993, Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006).   It is 
hard to put Culver’s Natural Silk Shampoo into this framework, but it works better with other examples.      3
the two models because beliefs about investment change systematically over the course of the 
bubble.  Specifically, we argue that investors hold two broad systems of beliefs about 
investment: growth and protection.  The former sees investing as a way to get rich; the latter as a 
way to secure the future.  As stock prices rose, investors’ beliefs shifted towards growth; as 
prices declined beliefs shifted towards protection.  The behavioral theory predicts that 
advertisements should respond to these shifts by catering to the changing sentiments.  The 
traditional theory on the other hand makes predictions based on the objective usefulness of risk 
and return information during booms and busts.  We test a variety of specific predictions of the 
behavioral theory and find they are consistent with the data. 
Economic research on persuasion has so far been limited.  A perceptive early contribution 
is Tullock (1967).  Posner (1995) draws a sharp distinction between persuasion (rhetoric) and 
provision of information, and discusses Aristotle’s and Plato’s ideas on the subject.  More recent 
research includes studies of hatred (Glaeser 2005), media (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005, 
Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006), and political persuasion (Becker 2001, Murphy and Shleifer 2004, 
Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shapiro 2005).  Gabaix and Laibson (2005) and Shapiro (2005) present 
models of marketing and advertising in which limited cognition plays a key role.  Becker and 
Murphy (1993) examine a model in which advertising and the good being consumed are 
complements.  Laibson (2001) extends this model to consider complementarity between goods 
and psychological cues. Our framework provides a belief-based foundation for the 
complementarity studied in these papers.    
Our results are also related to several previous findings in finance.  Some of these 
findings indicate that messages such as name changes of mutual funds or firms affect investor 
behavior.  For example, Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005) find that when a fund changes its name   4
to a popular style, it receives high inflows from investors.  Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2003) 
find that changing a firm’s name to a dot.com results in large price increases during the internet 
bubble.  Resnick and Stern (1977) and Cronqvist (2005) show that financial advertising is 
inconsistent with the standard model of what data rational investors would require.  Swensen 
(2005) offers trenchant criticism of mutual fund advertising as a way of misleading investors.  
Our work is also related to a significant body of research examining trend-chasing by 
investors (e.g., DeLong et al. 1990, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998).  Theoretically, this 
research tends to assume that investors extrapolate past returns, and pursue styles that have done 
well in the past (e.g., Barberis and Shleifer 2005).  Empirically, several authors find a strong 
positive relation between mutual fund past performance and subsequent fund inflows (Ippolito 
1992, Chevalier and Ellison 1997, Sirri and Tufano 1998).  Our research fully accepts the finding 
that belief systems are shaped by extrapolation, but then considers the optimal content of a 
persuasive message in light of these beliefs.  Put differently, the question of optimal persuasion 
can be treated separately from the question of how beliefs are formed.  
We focus solely on the content of persuasive messages, on the assumption that 
advertisers, as profit maximizing firms, on average know which messages work.  We do not 
consider the possibility that advertisers herd, are vulnerable to biases, or otherwise supply 
messages that do not work.  Nor do we consider the effectiveness of advertising empirically.  
Jain and Wu (2000) present evidence that advertising by mutual funds is effective in increasing 
inflows into these funds, but is not predictive of superior future returns.  Cronqvist (2005) also 
documents the effectiveness of financial advertising for attracting inflows into mutual funds, 
even though much of such advertising is non-informative.  Reuter and Zitzewitz (2005) show   5
that favorable mentions in the articles in financial press are more effective than advertising itself 
in bringing fund inflows.  Our topic is not the effectiveness, but the content of persuasion. 
In the next section, we summarize some of the principal differences between the 
traditional and the behavioral models of persuasion.  In Section 3, we motivate our empirical 
analysis based on the data from Merrill-Lynch advertising campaigns over the course of the 
internet bubble.  Section 4 presents a highly stylized model that generates more specific 
hypotheses about the content of financial advertising over the course of the bubble.  Sections 5 
and 6 then present some evidence bearing on these hypotheses.  Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Theories of Persuasion.  
In the traditional theory, persuasion communicates objectively useful information about 
characteristics of the product.  Consumers use these data to rationally update their beliefs about 
the product, and then decide whether or not to buy it.  Moreover, consumers do not take the 
information they receive at “face-value,” but rather recognize that withholding data is itself 
information.  This limits how much persuaders can hide since silence leads investors to rationally 
assume the worst (Akerlof 1970, Grossman and Hart 1980).  
What does this model predict about financial advertising?  First, it predicts that 
advertisers should provide information on fees and product choices to investors just as Stigler 
has suggested.  Second, mutual funds should rarely present returns, since returns tend not to 
persist.  To the extent that they present returns, they should present relative returns, since 
absolute returns are not the information relevant to investors assessing fund manager quality.  
Third, mutual funds should present data on risk.  Finally, traditional theory predicts that these 
data ought to be included in financial advertising.  A fund that fails to disclose its relative returns   6
would be inferred to be a poor performer; likewise, a fund that fails to disclose its fees should be 
inferred to be expensive
3.   
  Behavioral models of persuasion yield very different predictions.  At the most general 
level, these models emphasize the importance of both cognitive and emotional response to the 
messages presented by persuaders (Kahneman and Tversky 1982).  As a consequence, people 
often ignore relevant data and do not process the messages they receive following Bayesian 
logic.  Effective persuaders could convey incomplete and even misleading information without 
the fear that the audience will assume the worst if not completely informed.   Effective 
persuasion may also include irrelevant information that arouses an emotionally favorable 
response (Carpenter et al. 1994).    
Research in psychology suggests a particular structure of successful persuasion (Petty 
and Cacioppo 1986).  Persuasive messages resonate with the audience’s prevailing beliefs and 
sentiments; put crudely, they tell people what they are prepared to hear.  In their study of media 
markets, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) summarize a considerable body of research in 
psychology indicating that people appreciate, find credible, enjoy, and remember messages 
consistent with their prevailing beliefs, and disregard messages that are not.  This is so for 
several reasons.  First, as Dorothy Graber (1984) shows, people often simply ignore messages 
inconsistent with their views and do not even think about them.  To get people even to pay 
attention, a persuader must deliver a message not too distant from prevailing beliefs.  Second, 
research on information processing shows that people find data inconsistent with their beliefs to 
                                                 
3 The very act of spending money on ads may constitute useful information, as it signals profitability or 
confidence of the advertiser (Nelson 1970, 1974).  In these signaling models, the content of the persuasive message 
is irrelevant.  This prediction is inconsistent with the systematic variation in content that we describe below.   
   7
be less credible, and update less as a result (Lord, Ross, and Lapper 1979, Zaller 1992, Rabin and 
Schrag 1999).  Third, people often seek out data that confirm their priors (Klayman 1995).     
There is another – perhaps deeper – way to motivate this behavioral approach to 
persuasion.  Individuals appear to represent the world as a system of connected associations 
(Gilovich 1981).  These association maps provide a representation of their beliefs and 
experiences.
4   A persuasive message must connect the product or idea being “sold” with these 
prevailing associations.  The contrast between this view of persuasion and the traditional view 
can be seen from some famous advertising campaigns.  The immensely successful Marlboro 
cigarette campaign, depicting a smoking cowboy, typically contains no words or data except for 
the brand name and the surgeon general’s warning that smoking kills.  Other than this warning, 
there is no information.  Yet the ads persuaded millions to associate Marlboro with cowboys, and 
indirectly with masculinity, independence, freedom and even the pristine and healthy 
environment of the American West.  Likewise, American Express sold billions of dollars of its 
travelers’ checks scaring Americans about being robbed in foreign countries.  The exhortation, 
“don’t leave home without them,” is solemnly delivered by Karl Malden, the actor who played a 
policeman on TV – an example of associational thinking rather than information.    
But can these illustrations be generalized?  We focus on financial advertising to argue 
that they can.  The reason that financial advertising is so useful for testing the behavioral theory 
is that investor beliefs about investing change over time, often in response to measurable changes 
in the environment such as past stock market returns.  The behavioral model predicts that the 
                                                 
4 Psychologists and marketing researchers actually measure the association maps.  Zaltman (2003) describes a 
system of structured interviews, in which subjects bring with them pictures of objects they associate with a 
particular topic, and then answer questions seeking to elicit the various emotional connections between these 
pictures. These interviews provide maps of mental associations, which can then be used by persuaders.    8
content of persuasive messages would change in response to these changes in the investor beliefs 
so as to deliver messages catering to beliefs prevailing at the moment.     
Perhaps one way to illustrate this point is to recall a story told to one of us by the late 
Merton H. Miller in 1987.  At that time, Miller was affiliated with a money management firm 
specializing in small stock investments.  As Miller told the story, the company had two 
brochures for prospective investors.  When small stocks were doing well, it handed out a 
brochure describing the small firm effect.  When small stocks were doing poorly, it handed out a 
brochure describing the diversification benefits of investing in small stocks.  Now, the two 
brochure strategy is difficult to reconcile with a traditional model of persuasion: an investor 
receiving the diversification brochure would surely suspect poor past performance.  Yet the 
strategy is broadly consistent with the behavioral model, in which people accept the evidence 
catering to their current beliefs without sufficient skepticism.   
More generally, to extract specific predictions of the behavioral model, we make 
assumptions about beliefs and how they change over time.  We propose that people hold in their 
minds two very different – and often conflicting – systems of beliefs about investing.  We can 
describe these systems as growth (investment as a way to make money) and protection 
(investment as a way to secure the future).  Growth is associated with wealth, independence, 
enjoyment, and freedom to do the things one likes.  Protection is associated with security, 
insurance against ill health and poverty, and freedom from adversity.  Growth and protection are 
intimately related to greed and fear as well as to return and risk.   
Crucially, these alternative systems of beliefs prevail at different times. A persuasive 
message taps into the system available at the moment (Tversky and Kahneman 1973).  When 
people already associate investment with getting rich, a persuasive message offers growth; when   9
people feel insecure about investments, a persuasive message offers protection.  The internet 
bubble provides a fertile testing ground for these theories precisely because the belief systems 
about investment fluctuated so radically over a ten year span.  As stock market prices rose, the 
growth belief system came to dominate investor thinking.  As prices fell in 2001, beliefs shifted 
to protection.  The behavioral theory predicts that the content of persuasive messages must have 
changed as well, offering growth after markets rose, and protection after they fell.  
This broad outline suggests our research strategy.  In the next section, we illustrate this 
description more specifically using the data from Merrill-Lynch advertising campaigns.  We then 
present one possible formalization of these ideas, and test its predictions using data on financial 
advertising over the course of the bubble.   
 
3. Data and the Evidence from Merrill Lynch Campaigns.  
We put together a data set of all financial advertisements from two magazines: Business 
Week and Money.  Business Week is a weekly business newsmagazine.  We examine all issues 
from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2003.  Money is monthly and more specifically directed at 
individual investors.  We examine all the issues from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2003.  
(The one year difference in coverage is due to hard copy availability in Harvard libraries.)  We 
copy and date all financial advertisements in every issue, both to count them and to examine 
their content.  We aggregate the information on both the number and the content of ads into 
quarterly series.  Since we are interested in the persuasion of investors, we eliminate from the 
data base business to business ads (principally investment banking ads, or other ads explicitly 
directed at companies).  Our total sample includes 1469 ads from Business Week and 4971 ads 
from Money.    10
  In addition to the name of the advertiser, we keep track of the category of service being 
advertised.  These include mutual funds, Individual Retirement Accounts or IRA’s (which 
usually but not always include specific mutual funds), 401k plans, brokerage services, insurance, 
annuities, private banking, financial advice (e.g., Schwab), general investment services, and 
other.  In many instances, the same company advertises different services in different ads: 
Fidelity offers brokerage services, investment advice, and its own mutual funds in different ads.  
In addition to presenting some data on overall financial advertising, we focus specifically on 
mutual fund ads (including IRA ads promoting specific mutual funds).  For those, we collect data 
on whether they mention their past returns, whether these are absolute or relative returns, and 
whether they mention Morningstar or Lipper ratings of the fund.  We also note whether these are 
stock, bond or mixed funds, and if they are stock funds, what is their investment style (growth, 
value, blend, or index).  Except for these very basic features, we do not keep track of the content 
of particular advertisements.   
  To illustrate some of the ideas we assess, consider Merrill Lynch advertising in Business 
Week and Money (along with T. Rowe Price, Fidelity, and Schwab, Merrill is one of the most 
prolific advertisers in these magazines). Over this period, Merrill ran six campaigns, respectively 
called “a tradition of trust”, “the difference is Merrill Lynch,” “human achievement,” “be 
bullish,” “ask Merrill,” and “total Merrill.”  The motto of each campaign always appears in the 
ad.  Figures 1 and 2 show the frequency of the ads from these six campaigns, by year, in the two 
magazines.  Roughly speaking, the first two campaigns precede the bubble, the third and the 
fourth appear during it, and the last two are run after the sharp market decline.   
  One way to compare these campaigns is to look at a representative ad from each.  “A 
tradition of trust” ads often show a grandfather and a grandson fishing.  The ads talk about slow   11
accumulation of wealth.  The difference in generations (as well as the activity of fishing itself) 
suggests slowness, tradition, skill, consistency, and patience.  The ads advise on how to protect 
oneself and one’s family financially.  Ads from “the difference is Merrill Lynch” campaign 
likewise show a grandfather and a grandson with fishing rods, and talk about the virtue of saving. 
This message changes in 1999.  A “human achievement” ad from 1999 shows a 12 year 
old girl wearing a helmet and carrying a skate board.  The image is much hipper and more 
modern than those from the previous campaigns.  In a truly transitional way, the ad refers to 
“Protected Growth Investments.”  The theme of the next campaign, from 2000-2001, is simply 
“be bullish”.  One ad shows a Merrill Lynch bull wired as a semiconductor board (the word 
“wired” itself has two meanings, connection and hyperactivity).  The theme of protection is 
gone; growth and opportunity emerge, unfettered by information.  After the market declines, 
Merrill switches to the “ask Merrill” campaign, with its emphasis on uncertainty in the world, 
and the company’s expertise in protecting its customers.  A representative ad is dominated by a 
page-size question mark, invoking insecurity, uncertainty, and the need for answers.  Finally, by 
the end of the decade we cover, the firm moves to the “total Merrill” campaign, with its familiar 
emphasis on protection and intergenerational fishing. 
  The Merrill campaigns are difficult to understand from the viewpoint of the traditional 
model of persuasion.  First, many of the ads provide no new data about Merrill Lynch.  Although 
some describe the products Merrill offers, others offer general financial advice (the virtues of 
saving for retirement and starting an IRA) or no information at all (the wired bull).  There is no 
mention of track records (absolute or relative), of the cost of Merrill’s services, let alone of risk 
and return.  Second, the content changes systematically over time in a way that is difficult to 
reconcile with a standard model of what data investors require.   12
  These campaigns are easier to understand from the perspective of the behavioral theory 
of persuasion outlined above.  First, the ads appeal to the growth and protection belief systems.  
Second, the messages Merrill sends change as beliefs change.  Merrill’s clients are relatively 
well-to-do individuals, whose prevailing belief system for investment is wealth protection.  Not 
surprisingly, Merrill’s ads portray the company as a bastion of reliability, expertise, stability, and 
longevity – exactly the message the behavioral model would see as persuasive.  At the peak of 
the bubble, however, the beliefs even of these investors have evidently changed, and millions of 
new ones entered financial markets.  Merrill responded by changing its message to evoke its own 
modernity and access to opportunities, as well as to present growth images.  After the bubble 
collapsed, protection ruled again.  The Merrill campaigns illustrate the central prediction of the 
behavioral model: a persuasive message panders to prevailing beliefs.    
  
4.  A Simple Model and Predictions.  
To organize the empirical work, we begin with a very simple behavioral model of persuasion.   
The model does not capture most of the subtle psychological ideas of how persuasion works, but 
has the advantage of yielding testable predictions.  In particular, we think of individuals 
evaluating investments in terms of their perceived risk and return, and of their “belief system” as 
the perceived tradeoff between risk and return.  Investors governed by greed believe that bearing 
extra risk brings considerable extra expected return; investors governed by fear believe that risk 
is not rewarded with return.  We assume that the perceived tradeoff changes with past market 
returns; more specifically high past returns activate the growth belief system.  We consider how 
the content of persuasive messages changes with this change in beliefs.      13
 Let  σ and r be the perceived risk and expected excess return of a particular fund.  The 
investor’s utility function, for simplicity, is given by U(σ, r) = r – σ.  At any given point in time, 
the investor perceives that the relationship between risk and excess return is given by r = aσ, 
where a>0 summarizes the individuals beliefs about how “easy” it is to earn excess returns.  
Thus, when a is low, the investor believes that extra risk yields little excess return; we describe 
this state of mind as fear.  Alternatively, when a is high, the investor believes that extra risk 
yields a great deal of excess returns, so we describe this state of mind as greed.    
  Crucially, the advertiser does not try to change investor beliefs, summarized by a.  
Rather, it takes these beliefs as given and tries to deliver a profit-maximizing message.  This 
message consists of up to two parts: a piece about returns and a piece about risk.  The firm can 
always choose to send only one of these signals.  We therefore write the message M as: 
 
 
In other words, the firm either  sends a signal about σ, or about r, or about 
both.  Consistent with the  evidence  summarized  above,  we  assume 
that the signal about expected return is typically the past return, so investors extrapolate returns.  
The signal about risk can be much less precise.  An advertiser might draw attention to its 
expertise in making investment decisions, the number of professionals on its staff, or even 
simply show a picture of a grandfather and grandson fishing.  
  Investors use their prior beliefs – the value of a they have in mind – to interpret messages 
and assess the utility from investing with the firm.  The firm chooses its messages to maximize 
the individual’s perceived utility, since doing so enables it to charge the most for its product. Our 


















of messages does not place a constraint on the firm’s message choice.  The only constraints on 
this choice are: (1) firms cannot lie about returns, and (2) investors interpret messages according 
to their prevailing beliefs.  We do not assume that firms cannot lie about risk (or safety), since 
that information is inherently fuzzy and therefore the opportunities to mislead exceed those for 
messages about returns.  So what are the consequences of each message?   
Choice 1: Send only a signal about return.  In this case, the individual expects r = mr by the face-
value assumption, as well as the assumption that he uses past returns to predict future returns.  
He relies on his prevailing belief system to infer that σ = mr/a.  So when only returns are 
publicized, the individual expects utility mr(1 - 1/a) from buying the product. 
Choice 2: Send only a signal about risk.  In this case, the individual assumes σ = mσ by the face-
value assumption, and relies on his prevailing beliefs to infer that r = amσ.  So when only risk is 
advertised, the individual expects utility amσ(1 – 1/a). 
Choice 3: Send a signal about both risk and return.  The individual now has a problem.  On the 
one hand, he takes the message at face value.  On the other, it may not lie on his belief line.  So 
what is this individual to do?  We assume a parameter b which measures how much the 
individual weighs the return signal versus the safety signal.  This parameter generates beliefs 




The weights need to be the same in the calculation for r and σ because the equilibrium belief 
condition r = aσ must hold.  When b is close to 1, the return signal is used almost exclusively.  
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signal actually lies on the belief line so that mr =amσ, then the messages are not contradictory 
and the same forecast is generated irrespective of b, namely r = mr and σ = mσ.  In other words, 
the individual accepts the message as his forecast.   
Given these assumptions, what will the firm choose?  We first establish: 
Proposition 1: The firm can always achieve the highest investor utility by choosing to send a 
return only or a risk only message. 
The utility under a mixed message is the weighted average of utilities under pure 
messages, with weights given by b, i.e., U(mr, mσ) = b U(mr, *) + (1-b)U(*, mσ).  So whichever of 
U(mr, *) or U(*, mσ) is higher yields a higher expected utility than a mixed message.    
  The next question is whether the firm will choose to deliver a risk or a return message.  If 
the firm is advertising returns, it sends a truthful message about its own returns.  If the firm is 
advertising safety, we have assumed it can mislead.  Let us take the extreme assumption that it 
can send the message σ = 0, i.e., that its investment strategies are completely safe.  Which 
message would it wish to send?  The inspection of two utility levels leads to:  
Proposition 2:  If a < 1, the best message is mσ = 0; if a > 1, the best message is mr.  
When investors believe the risk/return tradeoff is shallow (they are driven by fear), most firms 
exclusively discuss safety.  When investors believe this tradeoff is steep (they are driven by 
greed), most firms exclusively discuss returns. 
Obviously, the extreme all return or all risk result depends on the linear utility function.  
With a more general utility function, the firm could choose mixed messages, although it is still 
quite possible that, when investors are governed by fear, it will pick an all-safety message.  Even 
in the more general model, however, a shift of investor beliefs from greed to fear leads to a shift 
in the firm’s messages from return to safety orientation.    16
This simple analysis, combined with the assumption that a is high when past returns are 
low, and low when past returns are high, yields two testable predictions.  First, it predicts that 
financial advertisers will disproportionately use returns in their ads when past market returns are 
high.  In those times, investors do not automatically assume that past returns have been high 
because of high risk, and therefore avoid the product.  Indeed, this prediction applies not just to 
using own raw past returns, but more broadly to all reports of own past performance: if those are 
high when investors are fearful, they will only infer that the investment is risky.    
Second, and perhaps more subtly, the model predicts that the incidence of presentation of 
returns in financial advertisements must depend on the past market returns (which are what shape 
the parameter a), and not on own past returns.  Thus even a firm that had good own returns, or 
good relative returns while the market was doing poorly, should still avoid advertising 
performance.   In the next section, we test both of these predictions. 
 
 
Optimal message is return when a>1   17
 
 
                  
Optimal message is safety when a<1 
 
5.  Advertising Own Returns. 
  We begin with the principal prediction of the behavioral model of persuasion, as 
generated by our model: 
H1:   Advertisers are more likely to present their own past returns after high market returns.   
In the traditional model of persuasion, absolute own past returns should probably not 
even be reported.  To the extent that a manager’s skill can be assessed based on past returns, it 
should be relative rather than absolute returns; absolute returns just muddy up the data.  Even 
with relative returns, there is a problem that superior performance does not seem to be 
predictable (Chevalier and Ellison 1997, Sirri and Tufano 1998).  Most importantly, we do not 
see how the traditional model could predict that own returns be reported disproportionately after   18
the market has gone up.  This would seem to contradict the basic implication of that model that 
when relevant data are not reported, investors assume the worst.    
  Before presenting the results on H1, we note that 40 percent of mutual fund ads in 
Money, and nearly half in BW, contain no reference whatsoever to past returns – absolute or 
relative.  If one believes that returns are essential information for assessing mutual fund 
managers, it is curious how often they are not even reported, especially if, as in the traditional 
model, investors assume the worst.   
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show for BW and Money separately that the rolling one quarter lagged 
S&P returns are strong predictors of 1) the share of ads with returns in all ads, 2) the share of 
mutual fund ads with returns in all mutual fund ads, and 3) the share of stock mutual fund ads 
with returns in all stock mutual fund ads.  The correlations are in the .5 to .7 range, depending on 
the specification.  Advertisers put their own returns in the ads after the market returns have been 
high, and take them out after market returns have been low.    
  Could this evidence be driven by advertiser composition, rather than cyclical changes in 
the persuasive message?  Perhaps the advertisers who persuade with past returns, such as growth 
mutual funds, enter during the bubble, but disappear after it crashes?  Figure 6 presents the data 
on the most prolific advertiser in these magazines, T. Rowe Price, a mutual fund company that 
also offers general investment advice, brokerage, and other services.  The data are presented at 
the annual frequency, since there is too much noise in the quarterly data.  The share of T.Rowe 
Price ads with returns in the total number of T. Rowe Price ads clearly follows the bubble on 
both Money and Business Week, suggesting that compositional changes are not the whole story.  
  As we indicated, H1 should apply not just to own raw returns, but also to any measure of 
own performance, since good past performance in the behavioral model is interpreted as an   19
indication of riskiness.  This observation enables us also to address the concern that the previous 
evidence supports not the behavioral model, but the simple hypothesis that firms only present 
returns when those have been high.  Under the latter hypothesis, but NOT under the behavioral 
model, firms should always present measures of performance that look good, including measures 
of relative performance in down markets.    
We use two measures of market-insensitive performance.  The first one is relative 
returns.  The traditional theory, as we noted, predicts that only relative returns should be used to 
begin with.  However, in our data, funds report relative returns less than half the time when they 
report returns.  The psychological theory predicts that the use of relative returns in all ads should 
decline, just as the use of absolute returns does, since investors are concerned with protection 
rather than growth.    
The second measure of performance we deploy to test the same hypothesis is 
Morningstar/Lipper ratings.  These ratings reflect fund performance relative to a peer group 
(Pozen 2002).  Under our behavioral theory, again, funds would not want to use these ratings 
after the marked fell, because investors are concerned with protection not performance.  
Figures 7 and 8 present the share of funds reporting relative returns in all funds 
advertising for Money and Business Week separately.  The results are somewhat ambiguous.  For 
Money, the correlation between this share and lagged S &P returns is an insignificant -.056.  On 
the other hand, there is striking evidence of an increase in the share of funds advertising relative 
returns during 2001-2002, consistent with the “report good news” hypothesis. For Business 
Week, the correlation between the share of advertising funds that present relative returns and 
lagged S&P returns is, at .41, both positive and high.  This result supports the prediction of the   20
behavioral theory that advertisers avoid all measures of performance, including relative returns, 
when market returns had been low.    
Figure 9 reports the fraction of ads with Morningstar/Lipper ratings of money manager 
quality as a fraction of total mutual fund ads.  For Money the figure reports a high positive 
correlation of .64 with past S&P returns.  For Business Week, the correlation is also positive, but 
much smaller.  The evidence thus seems to be generally supportive of the prediction of the model 
that advertisers eschew even market-insensitive proxies for performance in down markets, 
although the evidence on relative returns in Money is more ambiguous. 
Finally, we turn to the hypothesis – closely related to the analysis above – that it is 
market returns (which shape investor state of mind) rather than the firm’s own returns that 
determine the content of advertising.   This hypothesis yields the prediction that, after the market 
has gone down, advertisers will avoid reporting returns even when they have mutual funds with 
superior relative past performance.  In other words, the absence of advertising funds with good 
relative returns is a deliberate choice, and not just the consequence of the dearth of such funds. 
Figure 10 presents the relevant data for T. Rowe Price, using the universe of T. Rowe 
Price stock mutual funds with assets over $300 million at the beginning of the period.  It shows 
that T. Rowe Price is a frequent advertiser throughout this period, and that it has many mutual 
funds outperforming S&P 500 after 1999.  If anything, the number of funds with good relative 
performance rises sharply during 2001-2002.  Nonetheless, both the number of stock mutual 
fund ads, and the number of such ads reporting returns, falls to near zero after the market 
declines.  Even though T. Rowe Price has many funds with positive abnormal performance, it 
chooses not to advertise them.  This finding is broadly consistent with our behavioral model of 
persuasion, and inconsistent with the view that “reporting good news” is always effective.    21
6. Product Choice. 
In our model and in the previous section, we focused on the question of how to advertise 
a given product.  However, there is a closely related question (which is not addressed by the 
model) of which product to advertise.  In the same spirit, our analysis would predict that firms 
should advertise products appealing to a growth-focused investor after returns have been high, 
and those appealing to a protection-focused investor after returns have been low.   
In this section, we test this prediction.  Specifically, we focus on the advertisements of 
growth funds compared to those of alternative products, whether mutual funds or other services.  
Growth funds are investment products most compatible with the growth belief system, and hence 
their advertisement should increase after the market rises, and decline after it falls.    
Financial economists discuss two particular equity investment styles (among others): 
growth and value.
5  Growth investment involves selecting portfolios of stock with rapid earnings 
growth, high price to earnings and price to book ratios, technology orientation, etc.  Value 
investment involves selecting portfolios with the opposite characteristics.  Although historically 
value strategies outperformed growth ones on average (Fama and French 1992, Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1994), in 1998-1999 value dramatically underperformed growth (Chen and 
Lakonishok 2003).  Growth investing cues many of the associations of the growth belief system.  
In contrast, it may be hard for an investor caught in a bubble to see how buying low sales 
growth, not-particularly-profitable, and otherwise out-of-favor stocks is the path to riches, 
especially at the time when exactly the opposite category of stocks has been earning huge 
returns.  If anything, value investment seems more compatible with the protection system of 
beliefs (hence the name, “value”).   
This discussion yields a further prediction of the behavioral theory of persuasion: 
                                                 
5 Other styles in these data include bond funds, international funds, index funds, and mixed style funds.    22
H3: Past S&P returns predict the share of mutual fund ads taken up by growth funds. 
  The traditional theory of persuasion predicts something different.  Financial research 
suggests that growth stocks were more overvalued at the time of high valuations than value 
stocks, and the latter were better investments.  (This was strikingly confirmed during 2001-
2002).  An informative message would have reminded investors that 1999-2000 was a time to 
reduce exposure to stocks, and even if one wanted such exposure, to shift toward value.  This is 
the opposite of what H3 predicts, but of course, according to the behavioral theory, investors do 
not interpret the informative message correctly.   
  Figures 11 and 12 show the proportion of mutual fund ads devoted to growth and value 
funds, respectively.  Over the entire period, roughly a quarter of mutual fund advertisements 
were taken up by growth funds, and roughly a tenth by value funds.  Figure 11 confirms that 
growth fund advertisement is highly responsive to past returns; indeed, growth fund ads nearly 
disappear during 2001-2002 after reaching over half of the total in 1999-2000. This result is 
consistent with H3.  Figure 12 shows that, if anything, the share of value fund advertising is 
lower after the market does well.  Perhaps the most striking feature of Figure 12 is that value 
fund ads rise AFTER – not before – the market collapses, i.e., in 2001-2002.  This is the period 
when value funds have already outperformed growth funds.  Again, this evidence is supportive 
of the behavioral model of persuasion. 
  One concern with this evidence is that it might reflect the composition of advertisers 
(although the behavioral model of course does predict that the composition of advertisers should 
change).  To address this concern, we return to T. Rowe Price, which (unlike, say, Merrill Lynch 
or Charles Schwab) does a lot of advertising of its own mutual funds but also offers other 
products, such as brokerage and general investment advice, which we think of as protection-  23
oriented products.  We consider the composition of the products that T. Rowe Price offers as a 
function of market returns. 
  Figure 13 presents the shares of advertisements of growth funds, all other mutual funds, 
and other services by T. Rowe Price in Money.  The share of growth fund ads rises at the peak of 
the bubble, but these ads literally disappear after the market begins to fall.  Instead, T. Rowe 
Price raises the share of ads of other mutual funds (including bond and foreign funds).  The 
correlation of one quarter lagged rolling S&P returns is .59 with the share of growth fund ads in 
all mutual fund ads, and .66 with the share of growth fund ads in all T. Rowe Price ads.  The 
persuasion strategy of this advertiser, then, is broadly consistent with the behavioral theory: push 
the growth funds when the market is rising, and products promising protection when it is falling. 
     
7. Conclusion. 
  Using data on financial advertising in Business Week and Money magazines between 
1994 and 2003, we present evidence supportive of the behavioral model of persuasion.  Over the 
course of the internet bubble, advertisers tapped into the growth system of beliefs when stock 
prices were rising, and into the protection system when prices were falling.  Evidence on both the 
use of fund returns in ads and the choice of products being promoted is consistent with the view 
that firms supply messages that pander to prevailing investor beliefs.   
  This conclusion on the nature of persuasion bears on a key question in the analysis of 
market efficiency in general, and price bubbles in particular, namely whether financial 
institutions play a stabilizing role.  Previous research has focused on one form of professional 
activities, namely arbitrage, and has shown that institutions often play a destabilizing role 
(DeLong et al. 1990, Brunnermeier and Nagel 2004).  But, as Kindelberger (1978) has   24
recognized long ago, institutions play another important role: they can facilitate or discourage the 
speculation by individual investors.  Our analysis shows that, at a minimum, financial institutions 
encourage speculation rather than contrarian behavior through their persuasion strategies.  If 
such persuasion works (something we do not show), its effect is to destabilize prices. 
  But there is also a broader point.  This paper, like Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), 
shows that competitive markets in information deliver what consumers want.  This, however, 
need not be the whole truth, or even the data most needed for consumers’ well-being.  Whether 
public policy can improve on these outcomes remains a wide-open question.      25
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